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Abstract
We study whether financial openness facilitates the economic integration of formerly
centrally planned economies with the EU-15. Two dimensions of economic
integration are considered: cross-country convergence of per-capita incomes and
bilateral trade in goods and services. We find that more financially open economies
effectively catch-up faster and trade more with the EU-15. These integrationenhancing effects occur over and above any effect stemming from domestic financial
deepening and other factors determining growth and trade.
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1. Introduction
The widespread progress on capital account liberalization, the massive increase in
financial flows across the borders, and the financial crises that hit emerging
economies in the ‘90s have stimulated a lively debate on the broad economic effects
of financial openness. This paper contributes to the debate by assessing whether
financial openness facilitates international trade in goods and services and per-capita
income catching-up across countries in Europe and the CIS. As the current wave of
globalization has generated widespread interest among national policymakers on the
factors and policies that best promote economic integration, the paper provides
empirical evidence on whether financial openness should be included among such
policies by focusing on two of the dimensions that most critically characterise the
process of economic integration, namely international trade and income convergence.
Several features characterise this paper relative to the existing literature. First, the
analysis specifically separates the concept of financial openness from that of
international financial integration. These two terms have often been used
interchangeably in the literature, but, in fact, they represent a mean-goal relationship1.
Financial openness is the process of lifting administrative or legal restrictions on
capital movements and hence creating the necessary conditions for the integration of
the domestic financial system into the global market. Thus, financial openness is
essential to achieve international financial integration, but the former does not
necessarily lead to the latter. Operationally, the analysis in this paper will employ
different empirical proxies: financial openness will be measured by an index of capital
account restrictions while international financial integration will be measured by
portfolio-based and equity-based capital flows.
Second, specific attention will be devoted to disentangling the effect of financial
openness from that of domestic financial development. As the two phenomena are
expected to be positively correlated, the variables used to proxy for financial openness
might also capture the effect of domestic financial development on the economic
performance. The consequence might be the overestimation of the actual impact of
financial openness. To address this problem, the econometric model will include
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See, for instance, the discussions in De Brouwer (1999) and Le (2000).
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indicators of the depth of domestic financial markets in addition to measures of
financial openness2.
Third, most of the literature on the effects of financial openness (or financial
integration) on economic performance essentially looks at economic growth3 . This
paper instead directly considers the income difference between rich and poor
countries, thus assessing the differential impact of financial openness on the speed of
catching-up. Moreover, in studying the contribution of financial openness to
international trade, this paper extends the existing literature on trade empirics by
considering variables not included in previous studies which used gravity equations4.
Finally, our investigation looks at two groups of countries: the formerly centrally
planned economies (referred as “emerging economies”) and a broader set of 44
countries from eastern and western Europe, North America and the CIS5. In both the
groups, there are clear incentives toward forms of regional cooperation and
integration. In this sense, our paper is linked to the fast growing literature on regional
economic integration 6.
The key results of the analysis can be summarised as follows. Financial openness, that
is the degree to which international capital movements are not restricted, significantly
facilitates per-capita income catching-up and trade integration. The trade effect is
particularly evident in the group of emerging economies. Moreover, these effects of
financial openness appear to work over and above any effect stemming from the
development of domestic financial systems. Finally, the effective degree of
involvement of domestic markets into global financial links (i.e. the degree of
international financial integration) also promotes economic integration in both groups.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 briefly surveys the theoretical
hypothesis on the impact of financial openness on the two dimensions of economic
2

Guiso et al. (2004) provides an in-depth analysis of the link between financial development and
financial integration focusing on the EU countries. They claim that most of the growth pay-off from
financial integration occurs through domestic financial development.
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Rose (2004) surveys the variables and channels that are most often investigated in the literature on the
macroeconomic determinants of international trade.
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This second group coincides with the membership of the United Nations Economic Commission for
Europe and it is therefore characterised by some significant degree of cooperation and integration on
socio-economic matters
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For a recent overview of this literature see Schiff and Winters (2003).
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integration. Section 3 introduces the econometric methodology and explains the
specification of the model. Section 4 discusses the results. Section 5 concludes,
drawing some policy implications and pointing to future lines of research. Tables and
variables are presented in the Appendix.
2. Some theoretical background.
This paper evaluates the effect of financial openness on two dimensions of economic
integration: international trade in goods and services and convergence of per-capita
income across countries. The theoretical underpinnings of the analysis are spelled out
in this section.
2.1. Financial openness and convergence of per-capita income.
Economic growth theory provides the rationale for linking financial openness (and
financial integration) to per-capita income. In both neo-classical and endogenous
growth models, per-capita income at a generic time t is determined by technology and
rates of accumulation of production factors (labour, physical and human capital)7.
Several arguments have been proposed in the literature to argue that financial
openness has an impact on such determinants of per-capita income.
One channel points to possible technological spillovers arising from capital account
liberalisation which spurs capital inflows and investments from abroad. Related
arguments emphasise the spillovers eventually stemming from transfers of skills and
increased competition. Another strand of research suggests that financial openness
will broaden risk-sharing opportunities for domestic investors, thus reducing the cost
of equity capital and hence increasing investment and the rate of capital accumulation.
Moreover, better risk-sharing options will allow countries to shift their investment
mix towards riskier and hence higher-return projects. On a different ground, the
political economy literature has pointed out the role of financial openness as a
commitment technology device. When economic policies are dynamically
inconsistent, capital account liberalization signals government’s intention to stick to
macroeconomic and financial discipline. This in turn reduces economic uncertainty
and hence favours longer-term investment and factors accumulation. Finally, financial
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For a formal treatment of the neo-classical model see Mankiw et al. (1992). For a review of models of
endogenous growth see Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995, Chapters 4 and 5).
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openness might be linked to income growth via the domestic financial system. In this
view, lifting capital account restrictions promotes faster development of the domestic
financial intermediation leading to a greater volume of credit being available to
finance profitable projects as well as higher efficiency in the allocation of resources8.
The central message of this literature is that financial openness positively correlates
with per-capita income (and with the rate of economic growth). Hence, the
implication is that if a country maintains capital account restrictions and limits the
degree of international integration of its financial markets, then it will experience a
widening gap in per-capita income relative to a partner which is more financially
open. That is, for a given level of financial openness of the partner country, the
income gap between the partner country and the domestic country will be greater the
lower the degree of financial openness of the domestic country.
However, this prediction does not go unchallenged. Several models emphasise
possible counter-effects of financial openness on income which might, in turn,
complicate the relationship between financial openness and income catching-up. If
domestic institutions are weak, increasing financial openness will lead to a capital
flight (even if the country is capital-scarce). This will hamper investment and hence
long term growth prospects. Similarly, since the capital account is a channel of
contagion in financial crises, its liberalization will make the country more vulnerable
to speculative attacks, sudden stops and capital reversal, which are in turn all likely to
have large negative output effects. Finally, informational asymmetries and/or preexisting distortions (such as trade restrictions) might well imply that foreign capitals
will be allocated inefficiently, for instance going to sectors where the country has a
comparative disadvantage9. All of these counter-arguments thus point to the
possibility that an increase in financial openness might in fact have perverse effects
on the income gap of the domestic country relative to richer partners.

8

Bailliu (2000) proposes a simple formalization of several links between financial openness and
growth within an AK setting. Bekaert and Lundbland (2001) and Henry (2003) discuss the effect of
financial openness on the cost of capital. Obstfeld (1994) shows that financial openness, when resulting
in capital market integration, supports risk-taking. Bartolini and Drazen (1997) examine the argument
that capital account liberalization can work as a signal.
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See Boyd and Smith (1992) for a critics of the perverse effects of financial openness when domestic
institutions are inefficient. A sceptical view of capital account liberalization based on various
arguments is put forward by Rodrik (1998). The empirical literature also provides mixed evidence on
the growth-effects of financial liberalization. For a broad assessment see Eichengreen (2001).
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2.2 Financial openness and international trade
Assuming that internationally well integrated capital markets will effectively emerge
from it, financial openness can influence the extent of international trade in goods and
services through two main channels. The first operates through risk-sharing and
production specialization10. Consider a region where countries are affected by
idiosyncratic shocks. If such shocks are large and volatile, or alternatively if
households are risk averse to a sufficient degree, then incentives to diversify domestic
production will be stronger, thus leading to low specialization. Open and well
integrated financial markets facilitate the diversification of ownership. This in turn
has two effects. First, if economic agents in one country hold debt and equity claims
on the output of the other country, then the dividend, interest and rental income
derived from these holdings contributes to smoothing shocks across countries. This is
thus a form of ex-ante international insurance. Second, to achieve consumption
smoothing, households in each country will undertake ex-post adjustment of their
asset portfolios following the realization of idiosyncratic shocks in the region. Again,
this will lead to smoothing the income of all countries. Once insurance is available
through international trade in financial assets, each country will have stronger
incentive to specialize in one production (or technology) in order to fully exploit
economies of scale (or technological competitive advantage). Specialization in
production will then create greater scope for international trade in goods and services,
as predicted from a standard neo-classical trade theory.
The second channel relies on the ability of the financial sector to divert savings to the
private sector. When domestic financial intermediation is weak and inefficient, firms
in export-oriented sectors are burdened by significant liquidity constraints and hence
trade less. Financial openness can help overcome those constraints by making more
external finance available to domestic firms. An implication of this model is that
international trade will tend to increase particularly in those sectors that more heavily
rely on external finance, such as projects in the manufacturing sector. A related
argument is that financial openness, by eventually facilitating the development of

10

For a discussion of the theoretical and empirical link between capital markets, risk sharing and
production specialization see Kalemli-Ozcan et al. (2003). For more empirical evidence see Imbs
(2003).
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financial intermediation and hence contributing to the establishment of efficient
systems of international payments, can work as a trade facilitation factor11.
Overall, with respect to international trade, the prediction on the effects of financial
openness is that countries that are more financially open should experience greater
volumes of international trade; that is, financial openness should facilitate country’s
trade integration with any partner.
3. Methodology and data.
Based on the discussion in Section 2, the paper estimates two equations. One links
financial openness to the difference in per-capita income across countries; the other
links financial openness to a country’s international trade. Modelling strategy and
estimation methodology are described below.
3.1 Modelling strategy
Lets’ consider the income-gap equation first. The log of per-capita income y in
country i at time t is assumed to be a function of K variables plus the degree of
financial openness z (as suggested by the arguments reviewed in Section 2):
(1) yit = f ( x1, it , x 2, it ,...x K , it , z it )

Denoting j as the partner country, the income gap between i and j can be written as:
(2) y jt − yit = f (( x1, jt − x1, it ), ( x 2, jt − x 2, it ),...( x K , jt − x K , it ), ( z jt − z it ))

For estimating equation (2), the regressors x1...xK on the r.h.s. need to be specified
Using a technology-augmented Cobb-Douglas specification for the production
function, a parsimonious set of regressors can be identified which includes (in logs):
the rates of labor accumulation (n), physical capital accumulation (k) and human

11

Kletzer and Bardhan (1987) provide a first formalization of the second channel. Further theoretical
advances and some supporting empirical evidence are reported by Beck (2001).
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capital accumulation (h) and a constant term (c)12. The empirical model for income
gap between country i and country j at time t is thus given by:
(3) dyt = α 0 + α1dnt + α 2 dht + α 3 dk t + α 4 dz t + ε t
where d denotes the difference between country j and country i (i.e. dyt = yjt – yit; dnt
= njt – nit; and so forth), α0 = cj – ci, εt is a normally distributed stochastic disturbance
term, and the α’s are parameters to be estimated. Note that if α4 > 0, then the more
country i falls behind country j in terms of financial openness, the larger the incomegap will be. This means that to reduce the income-gap, country i will have to increase
its degree of financial openness for any given degree of financial openness achieved
by the partner j. The role of financial openness in the process of per-capita income
convergence can thus be tested through the null hypothesis H0 : α4 = 0.
Two modifications of equation (3) will be considered. First, as discussed in the
introduction, it is important to separate the effect of financial openness from that of
domestic financial development. For this purpose, a term dqt, where q is a proxy of
the depth of domestic financial intermediation, will be added to equation (3). Second,
as several theoretical models predict that financial openness will impact on per-capita
income by directly affecting the rate of physical capital accumulation, the inclusion of
the term dkt might bias the estimated α4 downward, thus leading to the conclusion that
financial openness is not significant when it actually is. For this reason, equation (3)
will be estimated both with and without dkt. As it will turn out, the null hypothesis H0
: α4 = 0 is rejected in both cases.
The second equation estimated in this paper is a gravity model of bilateral trade. The
gravity approach posits that the volume of trade between two partners is positively
related to their economic size and inversely related to their distance. This approach
has received wide empirical support and recent studies have shown how it can be
closely linked to formal theories of international trade13 . Therefore, it seems to be the
most appropriate tool to test whether financial openness promotes trade integration.
12

The underlying assumption being that technology grows at a constant rate and that its initial level is
equal to a constant plus a white noise. See Mankiw et al. (1992).
13
For a discussion of gravity equations, see, inter alia, Evenett and Keller (2002).
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For a given year t, the gravity equation expresses trade of country i with the partner
country j (Tij) as a function of the economic size of the two countries (Y), the
geographical distance between them (D) and a set of additional geographical,
economic and environmental variables W:

(4) Tij , t =

Yi, t Y j , t
Dij , t

exp(Wij , t )

Taking logs on both sides, equation (4) becomes:
(5) ln(Tij , t ) = ln(Yi, t Y j , t ) − ln( Dij , t ) + Wij , t

Following the arguments presented in Section 2, financial openness of country i (zi)
will be included in the set W. Similarly to the specification of the per-capita income
gap equation, a proxy for domestic financial depth in country i will also enter the
r.h.s. so as to disentangle the effect of financial openness from that of financial
development. Thus, the gravity equation to be estimated is:
(6) ln(Tij , t ) = β 0 + β1 ln(Yi, t Y j , t ) + β 2 ln( Dij , t ) + β 3 z i, t + β 4 qi, t + υ ij , t

where υ is a stochastic disturbance term, and β's are the parameters to be estimated. It
goes without saying that, whilst formally indexed by the subscript t, distance D is
constant over time. Again, the sign and statistical significance of the coefficient β3
will provide empirical evidence on the impact of financial openness on the degree of
trade integration of country i with partner j. A statistically significant and positive
value of β3 would indicate that financial openness promotes trade integration.
Drawing on the gravity literature, equation (6) will also be expanded by adding some
dummy variables to the set W in order to isolate specific trade facilitating conditions.
3.2. Estimation methodology and data

Sample and methodology
Equations (3) and (6) are estimated on two groups of countries. The first group
includes only formerly planned economies (so-called emerging economies). The
9

second group consists of 44 countries, including industrial as well as emerging
economies. The sample covers the period 1990-2003

14

. Trade integration and per-

capita income convergence are estimated for each country i vis-à-vis the European
Union-15 (EU-15) average, which is therefore taken to be the reference partner. That
is, in both equations, j is represented by the EU-15 average. This makes it possible to
assess the effect of financial openness on the process of economic integration of
country i with the EU-15. In fact, the main findings are qualitatively unchanged if the
United States or the richest among EU-15 economies are used as reference partners.
To account for reverse causality; that is for the possibility that financial openness is
determined by trade volumes and per-capita income growth, equations (3) and (6) will
be estimated by 2SLS, using lagged and initial values of endogenous variables as
instruments. The estimator is further corrected to account for the fact that the annual
panel is unbalanced.15
To operationalise equation (3), y is measured by a country's real per-capita GDP, n is
proxied by the fertility rate, h is proxied by the enrolment rate in tertiary schooling, k
is proxied by the real investment share of GDP, q is defined as country's ratio of M2
minus narrow money to narrow money. In equation (6), instead, T is measured by a
country's exports to and imports from the EU-15 (in logs of millions USD), Y is given
by real aggregate GDP and D is the log of distance (in kilometres) between a country
and Frankfurt-am-Main. A complete list of variables, definitions and sources is given
in the Appendix. Moreover, the next section will discuss the sensitivity of
econometric results to changes in variables definition and construction.

14

The panel is however unbalanced as for some countries the first available observation comes later
than 1990. The group of emerging economies includes: Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus,
Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Latvia, Lithuania,
Moldova, Poland, Romania, Russian federation, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Ukraine. The group f 44
economies includes all of the above emerging economies plus: Austria, Belgium, Canada, Cyprus,
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Luxembourg, Malta,
Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States.

15

The unbalanced panel estimator follows Verbeek and Nijman (1996). An alternative to the 2SLS
instrumental variable estimator would be a 3SLS system estimator (see Wooldridge, 2002). In this case,
equations (3) and (6) are estimated as a system together with an equation where financial openness is
the dependent variable and trade and per-capita income enter as explanatory variables. In fact, a set of
estimates from the 3SLS procedure are available from the authors upon request. The qualitative thrust
of results does not change relative to the single-equation 2SLS presented in the next section. We prefer
reporting the 2SLS and not the 3SLS because the focus of this analysis is more on the estimation of
reduced-form equations than on structural models.
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Empirical definition of financial openness and international financial integration
Crucial to the estimation of equations (3) and (6) is the empirical definition of the
variable z, the degree of financial openness. This should capture the extent to which a
country does not restrict capital movements across borders. At the same time,
however, it should not be based on the actual volume of cross-holdings of foreign
assets and liabilities, as in this case it would be a measure of international financial
integration rather than financial openness. A suitable strategy, indeed rather common
in the literature, is to construct an index of capital account liberalisation using the
information available from the IMF's Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and
Exchange Restrictions (AREAR) 16. We follow the approach proposed by Chinn and
Ito (2001) and construct our variable z as follows.
From the AREAR we define for each country and each year four dummies: (i) R1
takes value 1 in the absence of multiple exchange rates, (ii) R2 takes value 1 if current
account transactions are not restricted, and (iii) R3 takes value 1 if capital account
transactions are not restricted, (iv) R4 takes value 1 in the absence of a requirement of
surrender of export proceeds. A variable SHARE3 is then constructed for each year as
the average of R3 in that year and in the four preceding years. Finally, z is obtained for
each country and each year as the first standardised principal component of R1, R2,
SHARE3 and R4. Thus, z is a indicator of overall cross-border capital liberalisation:
higher values denote greater financial openness.
Equations (3) and (6) will also be estimated replacing the indicator of financial
openness z by two measures of international financial integration taken from Lane and
Milesi-Ferretti (2003):

p1, it =

FAit + FLit
GDPit

and

p 2, it =

PEAit + PELit + FDIAit + FDILit
GDPit

where, as usual, i denotes a country and t a given year, FA is the stock of foreign
assets, FL is the stock of foreign liabilities, PEA and PEL are the stocks of portfolio
equity assets and liabilities respectively, FDIA and FDIL are the stock of foreign
direct investment assets and liabilities respectively. Thus, the variable p1 measures the

16

See Miniane (2004) for a survey of various approaches adopted in the construction of such indices.
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overall volume of cross-holdings for a given country in a given year. The variable p2
measures instead the volume of cross-holdings in equity.
4. Econometric results

4.1 Financial openness and per-capita income-gaps.
The results for the income gap equation are reported in Table 1. The estimates for the
group of emerging economies are shown in columns I to IV; the estimates for the full
sample of 44 countries are displayed in columns V to VIII.
Starting with emerging economies, column I reports the baseline specification of
equation (3) without dk. The estimated coefficient on dz is positive and statistically
significant. This means that the more a country approaches the degree of financial
openness of the EU-15, the smaller its income gap relative to the EU-15 average will
be. The effect holds over and above the impact of differences in domestic financial
depth and in the rates of factors accumulation. Columns II and III show the same
baseline equation re-estimated with measures of gaps in the degree of international
financial integration (dp1 and dp2). The evidence is complementary to that in column
I: countries that fall behind the EU-15 average in terms of their degree of international
financial integration tend to experience greater income gaps. Finally, in column IV the
gap in physical capital accumulation, dk, is included. A couple of interesting findings
emerge. The coefficient on dz remains positive and different from zero; actually, it
substantially increases, whilst the coefficient on dq decreases (even though it remains
statistically significant at high confidence levels). Moreover, the effect of gaps in
investment rates appear to be marginally very small. Taken all together, these findings
suggest that in emerging economies financial openness impacts catching-up not only
through its effect on the level of the investment rate in the economy and/or its
contribution to domestic financial development. The discussion in Section 2 has in
fact emphasised other possible channels, including investment-composition effects
and productivity/technological spillovers.
Turning to sample of all countries, it is evident that results are qualitatively very
similar to that reported for the group of emerging economies. If anything, the
marginal effects of both financial openness and domestic financial development
appear to be larger, as denoted by the point estimates in column V. Interestingly, the
inclusion of dk also leads to an increase in the coefficient on dz and a
contemporaneous decrease in the coefficient on dq. However, differently, from the
12

case of emerging economies, the gap in the investment rate now has a significant
impact on the income gap. Finally note that in both groups, the income gap
significantly depends on the gap in the rate of human capital accumulation, whilst the
gap in labour force accumulation appears to have no effect.
Various robustness checks have been performed to test the sensitivity of the results.
First, to test for the impact of “absolute” rather than “relative” financial openness, the
income-gap equation has been re-estimated using the level of z rather than of dz (and
the same for q and dq). In the basic specification without dk, the estimated coefficient
on z is –0.185 (significant at 5%) for the emerging economies and –0.583 (significant
at 1%) for the full sample. Hence, as expected, countries that are more financially
open in absolute terms tend to experience smaller per-capita income gaps vis-à-vis the
EU-15 average. Second, drawing on the growth literature, differences in the degree of
institutional development have also been entered on the r.h.s. of equation (3). This,
however, does not produce any significant change in the role of financial openness,
even though the point estimate of the coefficient on dz decreases (still significant at
1%) in the group of emerging economies. Finally, different proxies for human capital
accumulation and labour force growth have been tried (e.g., enrolment in secondary
rather than tertiary school, population growth rather than fertility rate). Similarly,
different indicators of the depth of domestic financial intermediation have been
considered (e.g., the M2 to GDP ratio and the domestic credit to the private sector to
GDP ratio). In general the coefficient on dz always retains its sign and level of
statistical significance.
4.2 Financial openness and trade in goods and services.
Estimates of the gravity equation (6) are presented in Table 2. Columns I to IV refer
to estimates for the group of emerging economies; columns V to VIII refer to
estimates for the group of 44 countries.
The basic gravity model in column I indicates that the more emerging economies are
financially open, the greater their trade integration with the EU-15 will be. The effect
of domestic financial development is instead marginally insignificant after controlling
for geographical distance and economic size. The next columns II, III and IV indicate
that greater international financial integration also leads to greater bilateral trade
flows with the EU-15 and that the effects of financial variables are substantially
unchanged when the set of regressors is extended to include a dummy for common
13

land border (border) and a dummy for landlocked countries (locked). In particular, the
coefficients on these two additional variables are largely insignificant, thus suggesting
that the extent of trade of emerging economies with the EU-15 is mostly explained by
economic size, geographical distance and financial openness.
The results for the full group of 44 countries highlight an interesting difference:
financial openness does not appear to increase trade to any significant extent. In fact,
the estimated coefficient on z has a p-value of slightly more than 0.1. Still, it does not
pass a zero restriction test at usual confidence levels. Moreover, its point estimate is
about ¼ of the value estimated for the group of emerging economies. Taken at face
value, this would mean that the role of financial openness as a trade-facilitating factor
is strong in the formerly centrally planned economies, but not in western economies.
The other results in columns VI, VII and VIII partially mitigate this conclusion. The
two measures of international financial integration exhibit significantly positive
estimated coefficients. Even more importantly, when the gravity equation includes the
two dummies for common border and landlocked countries, the coefficient on z
becomes significant, albeit the corresponding marginal effect remains much smaller
than that estimated for the emerging economies. Overall, the evidence does suggest
that the trade promoting-effect of financial openness is stronger and more relevant for
the emerging economies than for the rest of the sample. A deeper analysis of the
reasons why this is the case is certainly an interesting avenue for future research.
Robustness checks analogous to those performed for equation (3) are carried out for
the gravity model (i.e. changes in the definition of q and inclusion of additional
variables on the r.h.s. of the model). Of some specific interest is the inclusion of a
dummy variable to control for the existence of preferential trade agreement between a
country and the EU-15. This dummy turns out to have a large and positive coefficient.
Furthermore, the variable D, distance, has been recomputed using different cities as
the EU-15 reference. Overall, results on financial openness are qualitatively
unchanged.
5. Conclusions and directions of future research.

The main result of the empirical analysis is that financial openness facilitates the
economic integration of emerging economies with the EU-15. This integration-effect
takes the form of faster per-capita income catching-up and greater bilateral trade in
goods and services. Furthermore, the effect of financial openness occurs over and
14

above the effect of domestic financial deepening. Thus, our results add to the list of
potential benefits of capital account liberalisation.
However, a number of qualifications are necessary. First, with respect to per-capita
income convergence, the regressions show that even if a country were to achieve the
same degree of financial openness as the EU-15, the gap in per-capita income levels
would persist as long as there are differences in technology and in the rates of factors
accumulation, particularly human capital accumulation. Hence, financial liberalisation
is only one of the several policies that countries need to implement in order to sustain
income catching-up. Similarly, with respect to international trade, the empirical
evidence indicates that financial openness ought to be embedded in a broader context
of policies for trade facilitation, including the abatement of tariff and non-tariff
barriers (e.g., inefficient custom procedures, inadequate transport infrastructures).
Possibly, the most crucial qualification concerns the possible side-effects and
downward risks of financial openness. While our empirical analysis emphasises the
benefits of free international capital movements for the process of economic
integration, the experience of several other emerging economies world-wide calls for
a careful design and implementation of financial and capital account liberalisation in
the formerly centrally planned economies

17

. The increased economic vulnerability

that is associated with integration into global financial links needs to be managed by
combining capital account liberalization with: (i) domestic financial sector reforms to
strengthen regulation and supervision, enforce sound and prudential lending practices,
achieve high-standards of governance of banks and other financial institutions; (ii)
trade policy and competition policy reforms to eradicate distortions that financial
openness might exacerbate; (iii) implementation of a coherent macroeconomic policy
mix characterised by low inflation and fiscal stability; and (iv) design of redistributive
tools to shield the most vulnerable socio-economic groups against the potential
damages of increased volatility. Finally, in the transition towards financial
liberalization, temporary and market-based capital controls might eventually be
considered to tilt the composition of inflows towards longer term maturities and so
prevent a maturity mismatch between investment projects and financing18 .
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See for instance the discussion in Johnston et al. (1997), Dailami (2000) and Daianu and Vranceanu
(2002).
18
Successful experiences with those type of controls are reported for Chile and other Latin American
and East Asian economies. See, inter alia, Edwards (2002) and World Bank (2000).
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A number of issues deserve investigation in future research. One concerns a better
understanding of the channels through which financial openness affects per-capita
income catching up. Several theoretical possibilities exist and our empirical analysis
indicates that financial openness does not produce its impact only through the
development of domestic financial systems and a faster accumulation of physical
capital. A more structural model is therefore needed to disentangle between other
possible transmission mechanisms. Future work should also consider whether, in
addition to the two considered in this paper, financial openness affects other
dimensions of economic integration, such as the sustainability of fixed exchange rate
regimes and the rate of nominal convergence. Finally, it would be interesting to assess
how the effects of financial openness on economic integration change across different
clusters of countries. This requires re-estimation for sample of countries selected
along different criteria (i.e. membership in a given regional economic community,
initial level of per-capita income, etc.) and compare the estimated strength of the
relationship between financial openness and economic integration dimensions.
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Appendix

Table 1 : Income gap equation – Basic specifications
Emerging economies

All countries

I
II
III
IV
V
VI
VII
VIII
constant 1.316*** 0.790
0.006
1.348*** 0.046
0.144
0.254**
0.173
dh
0.967**
1.256*** 1.550*** 1.007*** 0.937*** 1.836*** 1.901*** 1.331***
dn
-0.288
-0.118
1.027
-0.282
0.143
-0.177
-0.202
0.189
dq
0.983*** 0.805*** 0.880*** 0.264*** 1.056*** 0.627*** 0.754*** 0.659***
dz
0.276***
0.999*** 0.642***
1.187***
dp1
0.785**
0.940***
dp2
0.842***
0.466***
dk
0.258
2.848**
Note : the Dependent variable is the difference between (log) per-capita income in the EU-15 and log
per-capita income of country i. For definition of variables, see the Appendix..
*,**,*** denotes statistical significance at 10%,5%,and 1% respectively.

Table 2 : Gravity equation
Emerging economies

All countries

I
II
III
IV
V
VI
VII
VIII
constant -21.820*** -19.657*** -17.150*** -21.272*** -14.869*** -15.778*** -14.506*** -12.647***
YiYj
0.987*** 0.908*** 0.834*** 0.980*** 0.758*** 0.770*** 0.756*** 0.692***
D
-0.948*** -0.756*** -0.557*** -0.967*** -0.226*** -0.211*** -0.260*** -0.139***
q
0.050
0.004
0.109*** 0.041
0.023
0.011
0.013
0.135***
z
0.194***
0.180*** 0.055
0.042**
p1
0.663***
0.144***
p2
2.200***
0.214***
border
-0.004
0.854***
locked
-0.063
-0.087
Note : The dependent variable is the log of trade (in millions of USD) between country i and the EU15. For definition of variables, see the Appendix.
*,**,*** denotes statistical significance at 10%,5%, and 1% respectively.

17

Variables description

Variables

Definition

Source

dy

Per-capita income gap. Difference between EU
average log per-capita income and country's log percapita income

WDI

dn

Difference between EU average log fertility rate and
country's log fertility rate

WDI

dh

Difference between EU average tertiary school
WDI
enrolment rate and country's tertiary school enrolment
rate

dk

Difference between EU average real investment share WDI and PWT
of GDP and country's real investment share of GDP

q

IFS
Index of domestic financial development: country's
ratio of liquid liabilities to narrow money. Alternative
definitions used for sensitivity analysis: domestic
credit to private sector to GD ratio and liquid
liabilities to GDP ratio.

dq

Difference between EU average q and country's q

IFS

trade

Country's exports to and imports from EU.

DoTS

YiYj

Log of country's aggregate GDP times EU's aggregate WDI
GDP

locked

Dummy variable taking value if country is landlocked CIA World
Factbook

border

Dummy variable taking value 1 if country shares a
land border with any EU-15 member

CIA World
Factbook

D

Log of distance (in kilometres) between country and
Frankfurt-am-Main

CIA World
Factbook

z

Index of capital account openness

See Section 3

p

Index of international financial integration. Two
versions are proposed: p1 and p2

See Section 3

dz

Difference between EU average open and country's
open

18

dp

Difference between EU average integr and country's
p. Two versions are computed: dp1 uses p1 and dp2
uses p2.

Note: WDI is World Development Indicators Database 2004, World Bank; IFS is
International Financial Statistics Database June 2004, International Monetary Fund;
PWT is Heston A., Summers L., Aten B. Penn World Tables Version 6, CICUP,
October 2002; DoTS is Direction of Trade Statistics 2004, International Monetary
Fund.
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